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1. Challenges to international efforts to contain and roll back the 
proliferation of biological and chemical weapons (CBW) centre on the 
changing dynamics of CBW proliferation, the challenges posed by 
developments in the life sciences, non-lethal weapons, the Review 
Conference of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons (OPCW), and current status of the international regime 
established to combat proliferation. 
2. In mapping out the nature of contemporary CBW proliferation, words 
must be used with care.  Even the word ‘proliferation’, which was 
imported from debates in the nuclear weapons field, can be misleading.  
It is usually taken to imply that weapons exist in tangible form, but in 
the international treaty definition of CBW the term also applies to 
chemical and biological agents held for purposes prohibited under the 
Conventions.  Thus the term ‘proliferation’ in the CBW sense takes us 
into the difficult realm of intangible factors such as intentions.  This is 
highly significant, because in the field of biological and especially 
chemical weapons, the weapons themselves are slowly being 
eradicated, thus making less tangible features of proliferation more 
important.   
3. ‘Proliferation’ increasingly will refer to the spread of dual-use 
technology that can be weaponised should possessors choose to do 
so, and that dual-use nature is the root problem for CBW non-
proliferation efforts.  This problem becomes a serious international 
security issue in the presence of various entities that exploit the duality 
for weapons purposes.  These entities include suppliers that are willing 
to meet the demand, including either industry or criminal organisations, 
and the demand-side actors that include states and non-state actors. 
4. The nature of proliferation is also complicated by recent shifts in the 
utility of chemical and biological weapons.  Recent patterns of conflict 
indicate that terror attacks on civilians are a recurrent feature of 
warfare, and in this context CBW may have a greater affinity with ‘new’ 
wars than old ones that were largely fought between militaries.  
Another aspect of new conflicts is the use of CW such as riot control 
agents for counter-terrorism and/or counter-insurgency purposes.  New 
developments in the life sciences may make this issue more prominent 
in the future. 
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5. The non-proliferation is based on four key pillars: treaty-based, legally 
binding arms control and disarmament; export control arrangements; 
'hands-on counter-proliferation', such as UNSCR 1540 and the 
Proliferation Security Initiative etc; and defence and consequence 
management.  It is in the second and third of these that dynamics are 
most noticeably changing, driven by state violation of CBW regimes 
and the rise of possible CBW terrorism. 
6. Life sciences are a highly dynamic research field, with new advances 
being made sometimes at a rapid pace.  This creates challenges for 
the non-proliferation regimes.  This is particularly true in the field of 
biotechnology, in which the potential of agents to do harm is growing 
exponentially but which has no international body charged with defining 
and enforcing safeguards against misuse.   
7. This problem is exacerbated and made more complex by the inherently 
dual-use nature of biotechnology agents and techniques, which means 
an assessment of the risks associated with a particular agent or 
technique needs to be balanced against the benefits of its peaceful 
use.  Squaring this circle represents one of the principal challenges for 
the non-proliferation community, one that needs a cohesive 
international response in light of the globalised nature of the 
biotechnology industry. 
8. Compared to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological 
& Toxins Weapons Convention (BTWC) is a relatively simple 
instrument, with no verification mechanisms.  This means it is an 
instrument of principle rather than procedure.  After some difficult 
times, it settled on the new course set out in the Inter-Sessional Work 
Programme (ISWP) after the 2001 Review Conference.  Despite low 
expectations, the ISWP model has been successful, and was 
consolidated at the 2006 Review Conference through the 
establishment of the Implementation Support Unit (ISU).   
9. Synergies between the different entities involved in the non-
proliferation enterprise are developed at the Meetings of Experts, which 
in August 2007 included 93 states parties, regional groups such as the 
African Union and the League of Arab States, and international 
agencies such as Interpol.  
10. In the US, which has focused on supporting the ISWP 2003-2005, the 
2006 Review Conference is considered a success.  However, the issue 
of compliance still causes concern in Washington.  A working paper on 
this topic was submitted to the 2006 Review Conference, which set out 
measures that states parties can take nationally, such as confidence-
building measures, working with the World Health Organisation, and 
improving national capabilities for detecting non-compliance. 
11. The US has rigorous processes for assessing compliance, and 
continues to offer assistance to other states.  In the event of an 
allegation of use, an attribution process is in place, working on three 
scenarios: overseas use affecting US nationals; overseas use not 
affecting US nationals; and use within the US.  
12. The issue of non-lethal weapons (NLWs) represents one of the 
thorniest issues in chemical and biological weapons non-proliferation.  
Their status under the CWC is the subject of great controversy, 
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although most would concur that it is necessary, one way or another, to 
define the compatibility or incompatibility of NLWs with the precepts of 
the Convention.  The key problem is to make allowance for legitimate 
use of agents such as tear gas (which are permitted under the 
convention) while preventing new proliferation fears or unlawful uses. 
13. It can be argued that riot control agents (RCA) and incapacitating 
agents (ICA) may be developed, held and used for purposes not 
prohibited under the CWC.  If this is the case, what constitutes a 
legitimate purpose?  It is here that the ambiguity, and consequent 
conflict, lies and thus it is here that the international community ought 
to focus its efforts.   
14. The Moscow Theatre Siege of October 2002 represented a new 
development in the use of NLWs.  The Siege raised some difficult 
questions, particularly over the very term ‘non-lethal’.  Given that the 
known death rate in the incident was 17.4%, can the agent used really 
be described in those terms?  The Siege was evidence of a clear 
interest in such weapons, and it appears that other drugs (such as 
pain-killers, sedatives and muscle relaxants) are being considered for 
weapons use.   
15. From a medical perspective, there are at least two serious problems 
with this.  The first is the ‘therapeutic index’, or the difference between 
the dosage required for a drug to be effective and that required for it to 
be lethal.  Since most or all drugs are toxic if taken in excess, this index 
is of paramount importance, and ‘non-lethal’ use requires this gap to be 
as wide as possible.  The deaths in the Moscow theatre were caused 
by overdose, as it was impossible to regulate the amount of agent 
applied to each individual.  Studies have suggested that the therapeutic 
index needs to be 10,000 times wider than for any known drug for 
usage to be reliably non-lethal. 
16. The second issue is the ‘time to drop’ or the time taken for the agent to 
act and incapacitate.  In a hostage situation, it is important for this time 
to be as low as possible so that there intended target has little time to 
react.  Again, this is a function of dose, something that was impossible 
to regulate in the Moscow Theatre Siege action. 
17. This presents serious challenges for proponents of NLWs.  Drugs are 
difficult to use as weapons as there is no difference between a drug 
and a poison.  In the absence of ability to closely control dose, there is 
no such thing as a non-lethal weapon in this context.  For many 
proponents of NLWs, this raises questions about their point of 
departure: the existence of a weapon exists which is inherently non-
lethal, which is not supported by science.  The legal decision here will 
need to utilise evidence-based science, which involves making difficult 
judgements about toxicity. 
18. Countering this is the argument that there was considerable potential 
for 100% casualties at the Moscow Theatre Siege if nothing was done.  
The 17.4% rate inflicted by the agent used looks favourable when set 
against that worst-case scenario.  Proponents of NLWs point out that 
using RCA or ICA to lower casualty rates does not necessarily mean 
advocating their use over other methods of resolving crisis situations.  
The Convention’s language on use of chemicals for law enforcement is 
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ambiguous.  Ambiguity may have its uses in certain situations, but in 
the case of NLWs some clarity is now required.  This represents a 
critical challenge for the OPCW.   
19. This and other challenges will be prominent at the forthcoming CWC 
Review Conference in April 2008.  In 2012, the CWC deadline for 
destruction of all chemical weapons destruction will be up, and the 
OPCW should move from being a disarmament institution to a non-
proliferation one (although this assumes that some chemical 
rearmament does not take place).  The overall global enterprise 
against chemical weapons actually goes beyond the OPCW itself: the 
Geneva Protocol, the BTWC and UN Security Council Resolution 1540 
all are part of this enterprise.   
20. In the case of the BTWC, this relationship is a dynamic one because 
the crossover between chemical and biological weapons means it is 
increasingly difficult to keep the two separate.  The CWC and BTWC 
can both be seen as very much products of their time: the 
interdisciplinarity of chemical and biological proliferation was less 
prominent when they were established than it is now.  Moreover, the 
'footprint' of a biological weapons programme, thanks to the advances 
made in synthetic biology, may be considerably smaller than in the 
past.  The BTWC has had to engage the scientific and technological 
communities to address this issue, and it may be that the CWC might 
have something to learn from that. 
21. The CWC's final destruction deadline, now only four years away, was 
an essential requirement during the Convention's negotiating process, 
but it is in some ways an arbitrary one due to inadequate earlier studies 
on destruction.  This is perhaps illustrated by the fact that the CWC in 
fact stipulates destruction by 2007 with states-parties able to request 
an extension till 2012.  Currently India has an extension until April 
2009, Libya until 2010, South Korea until 2008.  The US estimates 66% 
of its stocks will be destroyed by 2012, and 100% by 2017.  A number 
of factors have contributed to the problems in meeting the deadline: 
adequate funding has not always been forthcoming, and technical 
problems were not always foreseen.  
22. Despite the challenges, the achievements of the OPCW to date are 
sufficient to make the Convention viable and necessary far into the 
future.  These achievements include the declared stockpiles that have 
been certified and destroyed, and the destruction timetables pursued 
by states parties: the US will have 50% of its stockpile destroyed by the 
end of the year, and Russia will have 23% certified as destroyed. Every 
facility labelled under Schedule 1 has been inspected at least six times, 
every S2 facility at least 3 times, and 20-40% of all S3 facilities have 
been inspected.  
23. There is pressure to reaffirm the 2012 deadline for destruction of all 
chemical weapons.  Although it is premature to say that the deadline 
will be missed, the predictions are not encouraging.  Nonetheless, the 
Review Conference ought not to lose sight of the reality of destruction: 
a highly complex and expensive process is still moving forward albeit at 
a slower pace than expected.  It might be an idea to run a Special 
Conference on the deadlines, to be held after 2008 but before 2012.  
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This could be worth pursuing: 2008 is, in many respects, too early for a 
proper consideration of the deadline, but the next Review Conference 
will be in 2013 and thus too late. 
24. The non-proliferation aspect of the CWC should also be highlighted at 
the Conference.  It is sometimes argued that non-proliferation may 
distract attention from the disarmament issue, but this is not really the 
case.  The two are in fact closely linked: non-proliferation gives a 
permanent reason to have the OPCW: it will monitor the peaceful uses 
of chemistry.  
25. The associated issue of universality will need careful consideration. 
Even if the 2012 deadline is met, the CWC will be unable to claim 
complete success as long as some states remain outside it.  Achieving 
universality will be a key challenge.  Real difficulties lay in wait here, 
particularly in the Middle East and North Korea (which remains the only 
state that has never responded to any of the openings).  
26. It is hoped that the Review Conference will renew the mandate to 
intensify and focus industry inspections on other chemical production 
facilities (OCPFs), where much remains to be done.  Here, it might be 
productive to arrange visits by OCPFs to Schedule 1 and 2 facilities to 
convey the differences which are hard to get across on paper.  
27. Other major issues include the impact of science and technology on 
the Convention. The scientific community made an important input into 
the first Review Conference in 2003, and many issues need to be 
studied, particularly nanotechnology, chemical engineering and the life 
sciences. Industry is another important stakeholder in the CWC 
process.  
28. The Review Conference will also need to look at international 
cooperation and assistance: this is a leading reason why many 
countries are in the CWC, particularly in the developing world.  It is 
understood that the OPCW is not a development agency, but the 
international co-operation and assistance programme is not about 
money but about well-tailored and well-focused assistance 
programmes. 
29. Both chemical and biological weapons have a potent but rather vague 
prominence as public concerns.  Policy is often driven by what is 
possible rather than probable, and public discourse is often 
characterised by conjecture and worst-case scenarios.  The 9/11 
Commission spoke of a failure of imagination in foreseeing catastrophic 
terrorism, but it is also possible to go too far the other way. There is a 
tension between failure to imagine and imagining too much.  
30. Uncertainty, particularly over events of high consequence, is something 
that publics are increasingly expected to reject.  The associated 
problem with this is that the maxim 'you can never be too safe' can lead 
to diversion of both attention and resources.  There are dangers in 
suspecting too much.  Ascertaining exactly what the public think is a 
difficult exercise. Opinion polls can be a useful indicator, but can also 
be an excuse to cover the absence of any real engagement with the 
public, which has been portrayed as anything between alarmed and 
complacent. 
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31. It may therefore be that we require a broader idea of the social context 
in which debate takes place.  Social attitudes are not derived solely 
from the media, but from popular science, political rhetoric, and 
business.  Security, in the years since 9/11, has become a major 
business.  In many ways Western publics seem to be prone to 
occasional scares: fears over bovine spongiform encephalopathy, 
genetically-modified crops and the measles mumps and rubella 
vaccine indicate a widespread propensity for fear on the part of the 
public.  The media amplifies these fears, but does not appear to be the 
driver or creator of them.   
32. How does this apply to the realm of CBW non-proliferation?  A problem 
is that the treaties and conventions governing the proliferation on 
chemical and biological weapons are necessarily complex, delicately-
worded and often dense documents, which do not readily lend 
themselves to the short, snappy explanation demanded by modern 
media.  On the other hand, the media does, as noted above, play an 
important role in the dissemination of public information on CBW non-
proliferation.  That role, while significant, is in many respects the only 
one really attributable to the media, and is one which may be under-
fulfilled: there is less appetite today for serious complex issues in the 
news media, which can lead to undesired consequences.  For 
example, the failure to agree a Protocol to the BTWC, widely reported 
in the serious news media, generated a narrative that international 
treaties were becoming less relevant.  Once imprinted in the public 
mind, such narratives can prove hard to change. 
33. In the aftermath of Iraq, levels of scepticism about CBW remain 
relatively high in the media and public opinion, but real knowledge of 
the issues remains fairly low, creating problems for reporting of the 
topic.  Moreover, many in the media charged with reporting on CBW 
issues are generalists not experts, and journalists are often confused 
about definitions and technical issues.  This is a particular problem 
when reporting an incident, as there is a need for speed, authority and 
clarity.  The 2003 ricin incident in the UK is a case in  point: ricin is not 
a weapon of mass destruction, but the misunderstanding was not 
corrected.  A popular perception arose that there was in fact no ricin at 
all. 
34. Without independent sources or verification, covering stories can be 
very difficult.  Government officials can give information and 
corroboration, but such sources are now regarded with suspicion. 
Governments are aware of this, and will often put forward its own 
scientists (such as the Chief Scientific Advisor or the Chief Medical 
Officer) which can produce more sound information, albeit with the risk 
of politicising experts and expertise.   
35.   Despite these problems, the media can play a constructive role in the 
non-proliferation enterprise: exposing loopholes in export controls, 
identifying states that are possible non-compliance, and the threats 
posed by proliferation. 
36. In global terms, the current counter-proliferation regime is confronted 
with significant challenges and there are a numbers of ways in which it 
might be strengthened.  As one example, the experience of the UN 
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commissions on Iraq (UNSCOM and UNMOVIC).  The Iraqi CBW 
programmes uncovered by the Commissions were initially dependent 
on foreign sources and thereby vulnerable to export controls, but 
subsequently became indigenous after those controls (in particular the 
Australia Group) began to have effect.   
37. Iraq demonstrated how easy it is to turn legitimate biological facilities 
into weapons facilities, and to hide them from inexperienced 
inspectors.  Civil biological facilities with no history of illegitimate 
activities can be much harder to trace than more specialised facilities 
that are closer to the line.  In the chemical weapons field, the lesson on 
the Commissions was that militarily significant quantities of chemical 
weapons can be produced by relatively small or even lab-scale 
facilities.  The current emphasis of non-proliferation is on industrial-
scale production, but a recent UNMOVIC study demonstrated that the 
small-scale type looks very different.  
38. Nonetheless, UNSCOM and UNMOVIC showed that well-planned and 
executed inspections can work even against systematic concealment.  
On-site sampling is the best tool for verification, and the human factor 
(i.e. Technical knowledge and expertise) is indispensable.  UNSCOM 
and UNMOVIC have conducted extensive work here: 59 courses exist, 
350 experts, and a roster of inspectors trained in inspection skills 
(ability to see through concealment,  recognition of dual-use 
equipment, understanding of critical technologies etc). 
39. The CBW treaties are good for stating aims and objectives and setting 
out frameworks.  It is in the areas of operationalisation and national 
enforcement that more work remains to be done.  This can take the 
form of establishing clear consensus on what is being attempted: the 
failure of the BTWC Protocol negotiations, for example, can be 
attributed partly to the fact that some participants thought they were 
negotiating a technology transfer agreement while others regarded it as 
fundamentally a security agreement.  Elsewhere, the emphasis in 
many states, particularly the US, is on enforcement of legislation, even 
among those states that already have extensive laws in place. 
40. Finally, and on a more encouraging note, it may be that the 
delegitimisation of CBW via the network of conventions, treaties and 
agreements, and the near-universalisation of the treaties, is 
approaching a point where even those states that have not signed up 
to the CWC and/or BTWC may be self-deterred from pursuing these 
weapons (this is less likely to be the case with non-state actors).  This 
is particularly the case with biological weapons, perhaps because they 
have a particularly abhorrent image (only one state, the Soviet Union, 
is known to have stockpiled such weapons).  Chemical weapons, which 
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